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Abstract
Psychological models of value-based decision-making describe how subjective values are formed and mapped to single
choices. Recently, additional efforts have been made to describe the temporal dynamics of these processes by adopting
sequential sampling models from the perceptual decision-making tradition, such as the diffusion decision model (DDM).
These models, when applied to value-based decision-making, allow mapping of subjective values not only to choices but also
to response times. However, very few attempts have been made to adapt these models to situations in which decisions are
followed by rewards, thereby producing learning effects. In this study, we propose a new combined reinforcement learning
diffusion decision model (RLDDM) and test it on a learning task in which pairs of options differ with respect to both value
difference and overall value. We found that participants became more accurate and faster with learning, responded faster
and more accurately when options had more dissimilar values, and decided faster when confronted with more attractive (i.e.,
overall more valuable) pairs of options. We demonstrate that the suggested RLDDM can accommodate these effects and
does so better than previously proposed models. To gain a better understanding of the model dynamics, we also compare it
to standard DDMs and reinforcement learning models. Our work is a step forward towards bridging the gap between two
traditions of decision-making research.
Keywords Decision-making · Computational modeling · Bayesian inference and parameter estimation · Response time
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Research on value-based decisions investigates how indi-
viduals value options and make decisions between them.
Every-day decisions can be based on descriptive informa-
tion, such as when choosing a restaurant based on reviews,
or on personal experience, such as when choosing a restau-
rant based on previous visits. Reinforcement learning (RL;
Sutton & Barto, 1998) describes the processes involved in
the latter case, and specifically how the value associated
with an option is updated following reward or punishment.
In the past decades, substantial progresses in understand-
ing the mechanisms of RL have been made both in psy-
chology (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson,
1994; Erev, 1998; Estes, 1950; Luce, 1959; Rieskamp &
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Otto, 2006; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005) and neuroscience
(e.g., Dayan & Daw, 2008; Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly,
2004; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Niv, 2009; Schultz, Dayan,
& Montague, 1997). Within this framework, computational
models can be used to infer latent value representations and
psychological constructs (Lewandowsky & Simon, 2010),
for instance, the reliance on more recent or past feedback
(often referred to as the learning rate). RL models usually
have two components: a learning component, that describes
how past information is integrated with newly received feed-
back to update options’ subjective values, and a choice
model, that maps the subjective values associated with the
options to the final choice probabilities. Despite providing
a good fit to choice data, this mapping function (e.g., the
soft-max choice rule) does not provide a description of the
cognitive processes that lead to a specific decision. Fortu-
nately, these mechanisms can be revealed by simultaneously
inspecting choices and response times (RTs). For exam-
ple, making the same choice faster or slower can indicate
less or more decision conflict, respectively (Frank, Samanta,
Moustafa, & Sherman, 2007). Furthermore, choices and
RTs might be differently affected under different conditions,
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and those cognitive processes that only affect RTs would be
overlooked by models based on choices alone.
Sequential sampling models (SSMs; for an overview, see
Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; Smith
& Ratcliff, 2004) are process models that aim to describe
the cognitive computations underlying decisions and allow
predicting choices and RTs in a combined fashion. SSMs
define decision-making as an integration-to-bound process:
When deciding between two options, noisy evidence in
favor of one over the other option is integrated over time,
and a response is initiated as soon as the evidence reaches
a pre-set threshold. Cautious decision-makers increase their
threshold to make more accurate, but at the same time
slower, decisions. On the other hand, if the situation requires
to respond as quickly as possible, the threshold can be
lowered at the cost of accuracy. When confronted with an
easy decision (i.e., between a very good and a very bad
option), the integration (or drift) rate is higher, leading
to faster and more accurate decisions. SSMs have been
successfully applied in many psychological domains (for an
overview, see Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016),
including both perceptual and value-based decision-making
(e.g., Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Usher & McClelland,
2001). In particular, the diffusion decision model (DDM;
Ratcliff, 1978), the dominant model in perceptual decision-
making, has gained particular popularity in value-based
decision-making research (Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2012).
Thus, the DDM has been used to directly compare
perceptual and value-based choices (Dutilh & Rieskamp,
2016), and it has been extended to account for and to
model eye-movement data in consumer-choice behavior
(Krajbich Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010; Krajbich, Lu,
Camerer, & Rangel, 2012). Moreover, building on the
discovery of a neural correlate of the integration-to-bound
process during perceptual decisions in non-human primates
(Gold & Shadlen, 2001), SSMs have also been used to
link behavioral and neural measures, such as the decision
threshold to activity in the striatum (Forstmann et al., 2008;
Gluth, Rieskamp, & Bu¨chel, 2012; van Maanen, Fontanesi,
Hawkins, & Forstmann, 2016).
While significant progress has been made in describing
the processes underlying value-based decision-making,
previous work mainly focused on situations in which
rewards are not provided after each choice. SSMs typically
assume that the subjective value associated with some
option is stable in time and that repeated choices involving
the same option do not affect its subjective valuation. The
assumption of stable preferences might hold in many choice
situations, but is presumably violated when some kind of
feedback is received after every choice. In these cases,
SSMs should be extended by adding a learning component.
To overcome the limitations of both SSMs (i.e., the
absence of learning processes) and RL models (i.e., the
absence of mechanistic decision processes), new models
need to be developed. The goal of the present work is to
propose a new computational cognitive model that describes
both the processes underlying a single decision (by relying
on the SSM approach of decision-making) and how these
are influenced by the learning of subjective values of
options over time (by relying on the RL framework). So
far, only few attempts have been made to combine these
two approaches (Frank et al., 2015; Pedersen, Frank, &
Biele, 2017). In particular, these studies have proposed
variants of the DDM in which an RL rule is used to
update the subjective values, and these values in turn are
mapped to trial-specific DDM parameters in a meaningful
way (e.g., the difference in subjective values is mapped to
the drift rate). Notably, in these studies, only the reward
differences between options were manipulated, but not
the mean values of different pairs of options. However,
mean values have been reported to influence the speed
of decisions (Palminteri, Khamassi, Joffily, & Coricelli,
2015; Pirrone, Azab, Hayden, Stafford, & Marshall, 2017;
Polania, Krajbich, Grueschow, & Ruff, 2014), and could
therefore be an important modulating factor of decisions
during learning. Finally, an open question remains whether
the subjective-value differences map linearly (as previously
proposed) or non-linearly to the DDM parameters (more
similarly to common decision rules in RL models, such as
the soft-max choice rule).
In the present work, we propose a learning task in
which not only value differences but also the mean values
across different pairs of options are manipulated. We
first test behavioral, cross-trial effects related to these
manipulations, and develop a combined reinforcement
learning diffusion decision model (RLDDM) that captures
the observed learning and value-based behavioral effects.
We then compare our model qualitatively and, whenever
possible, quantitatively to other classes of models. We show
that some of the value-based effects would have remained
unnoticed if only choices but not RTs were taken into
account—in particular those that are related to the mean
value of pairs of options. Finally, we perform a rigorous
model comparison analysis that illustrates the predictive
advantages of the new model and provides insights into




A total of 32 participants (24 female, age: 18–36, M =
22.36, SD = 2.14) completed the experiment. Participants
were mainly psychology students recruited through the
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subject pool of the Faculty of Psychology of the University
of Basel. Participation in the experiment was possible for
partial fulfillment of course credits or cash (20 Swiss francs
per hour). In addition, a monetary bonus corresponding to
the performance in the experiment was awarded. Before
starting the experiment, participants gave informed consent,
as approved by the institutional review board of the Faculty
of Psychology, University of Basel. The instructions of the
task were presented directly on the screen. Information
about participants’ gender, age, handedness, and field of
study were also requested on-screen before starting the task.
Since an accuracy above 56% across 240 trials is unlikely
due to random behavior alone, according to a binomial test
(p < 0.05), only participants who surpassed this threshold
were included in the analyses. Raw data and scripts will be
made available upon publication of the manuscript at https://
osf.io/95d4p/.
Learning paradigm
The paradigm was a multi-armed bandit problem (Sutton
& Barto, 1998). A total of four options per block were
presented and participants chose between two of them
in each trial. Options were randomly assigned either to
the left or to the right of a fixation cross, and could be
chosen by pressing either Q (for left) or P (for right)
on the keyboard. After each choice, participants saw both
options’ rewards (i.e., full feedback) and collected the
chosen option’s reward. At the end of the experiment, the
accumulated reward, divided by 1400, was paid in Swiss
francs to the participants as a bonus (e.g., if they collected
7000 points, they received 5 Swiss francs). On average,
participants gained a bonus of 8.10 Swiss francs.
Participants completed three experimental blocks of 80
trials, for a total of 240 trials. The payoffs of each option
were not fixed but varied and were approximately normally
distributed (Fig. 1). The mean rewards of the options in each
block were 36, 40, 50, and 54 for options A, B, C, and D,
respectively. The standard deviation was 5 for all options.
The payoffs were rounded to the unit, and were controlled
to have representative observations (i.e., each participant
observed the same outcomes in a different order, and the
sample mean of each option was equal to the generating
mean). The order of the payoffs of a single option was
different in each block, and options were associated with
four new visual stimuli (see below for a description of the
visual stimuli), so that the options had to be learned again in
a new block.
Each trial (Fig. 2) was separated by a fixation cross,
presented for 750–1250 ms. The options were presented for
up to 5000 ms. If a response was faster than 150 ms or
slower than 3000 ms, the trial was discarded and a screen
reminding to be slower or faster, respectively, was presented
Fig. 1 Reward distribution of the options A, B, C, and D in a learning
block
for 5000 ms after the participant’s response. Otherwise, the
feedback was presented for 1500 ms.
Design
In each learning block, only four of the six possible pairs
of options were presented: AB, AC, BD, and CD (but not
AD and BC). The order was pseudo-randomized so that
the same pair would not be presented more than three
times in a row. Presenting these four couples of options
allowed us to test whether our model can predict two
established behavioral effects of reward-based decision-
making in addition to the learning effects. Previous studies
have shown that, when deciding among options that have
similar values (i.e., difficult choices), people tend to be
slower and less accurate (e.g., Dutilh & Rieskamp, 2016;
Oud et al., 2016; Polania et al., 2014). We will refer to this





Fig. 2 Example of a single trial: First, a fixation cross is shown
from 750 to 1250 ms; then, two of the four options are shown and
a choice has to be made; finally, the reward corresponding to both
options is presented, and the reward corresponding to the chosen
option (highlighted by a black rectangle) is collected
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by the mean value difference, was low in pairs AC and BD
(the difference was 14 on average), and high in pairs AB
and CD (the difference was 4 on average). Previous studies
have also shown that absolute shifts in value can affect
decision speed without necessarily changing accuracy (e.g.,
Palminteri et al., 2015; Pirrone et al., 2017; Polania et al.,
2014): Participants tend to be faster when deciding between
two higher-valued options as compared to two lower-valued
options. We will refer to this effect as the magnitude effect.
In our study, magnitude, given by the mean value of the
pairs of options, was lowest in pair AB (38), followed by AC
(43), BD (47), and CD (52). Finally, we refer to the learning
effect as the improvement in performance throughout the
trials. In this study, each pair was presented for 20 trials per
block, and each option was presented in 40 trials per block
(since each option is included in two different pairs).
Stimuli
During the experiment, each participant saw a total of
twelve different figures (four in each block) representing the
options. The figures were matrices of 5×5 squares of which
17 were colored, arranged symmetrically along the vertical
axis. To control for visual salience, we selected 12 evenly
spaced colors in the HSLUV space. A black rectangle was
drawn around the chosen option at feedback presentation
to highlight the collected reward. The experiment was
programmed and presented using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007).
Cognitivemodels
In total, we estimated three classes of computational
models: RL models, the DDM, and combinations of the
two, RLDDM (some of which were previously proposed by
Pedersen, Frank, and Biele (2017)). In the next sections, we
present each class of models in detail.
Reinforcement learningmodels
RLmodels assume that the subjective values associated with
the options are updated in each trial after experiencing a
new reward (i.e., the reward feedback). These subjective
values are then mapped to the probability of choosing one
option over the other: Options with higher subjective values
are chosen more often. Participants can differ in how much
weight they give to new compared to old information:
When more weight is given to old information, they are
less affected by sudden changes in the rewards. They can
also differ in how sensitive they are to subjective value
differences: When they are very sensitive, their choices
become more deterministic as they tend to always choose
the option with the highest value. These two constructs,
the stability of the subjective values and the deterministic
nature of choices, are formalized in RL models by two
parameters. The learning rate η (with 0 ≤ η ≤ 1),
and the sensitivity θ (with θ ≥ 0). The learning rate
is the weight that is given to new information when
updating the subjective value. When η is close to 0, the old
subjective value remains almost unchanged (implying that
even observations dating far back are taken into account),
whereas when η is close to 1, the new subjective value
almost coincides with the new information (implying that
earlier observations are heavily discounted). The sensitivity
parameter regulates how deterministic the choices are. With
a higher θ , choices are more sensitive to value differences,
meaning that subjectively higher-valued options will be
chosen over lower-valued options with higher probability.
On each trial, the subjective values Q of the presented
options are updated following the so-called delta learning
rule:
Qt = Qt−1 + η · (ft − Qt−1) (1)
where t is the trial number, and f is the experienced
feedback. In the first learning block, Q-values were
initialized at 27.5. This value was the average value shown
in the task instructions at the beginning of the experiment,
which was the same for all participants. In the subsequent
learning blocks, the Q-values were initialized at the mean
values learned in the previous blocks. We reasoned that
adjusting initial Q-values according to prior knowledge
is more realistic than simply initializing them at zero.
Indeed, preliminary model estimations revealed that all
models provided better fits when adjusting Q-values to




(eθQcor + eθQinc) (2)
where p is the probability of choosing the option with the
highest mean reward, and Qcor and Qinc are the subjective
values of the options with a higher and lower mean reward,
respectively.
Building on the simplest RL model, we took into account
models that incorporate all possible combinations of two
additional mechanisms, one concerning the learning rule
and one concerning the choice rule. The first alternative
mechanism allows η to differ depending on the sign of the
reward prediction error. The reward prediction error is the
difference between the feedback ft and the previous reward
expectation Qt−1. Previous studies have found differences
in learning rates for positive and negative reward prediction
errors (Gershman, 2015) and have related this feature to
optimism bias (Lefebvre, Lebreton, Meyniel, Bourgeois-
Gironde, & Palminteri, 2017). The second mechanism
allows θ to increase as a power function of how many
times an option has been encountered before (as in
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Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005) so that choices become more






where n is the number of times an option has been
presented, b (with b > 0) is a scaling parameter, and c (with
c ≥ 0) is the consistency parameter. When c is close to 0,
θ reduces to 1 and is fixed in time, while higher values of c
lead to steeper increase of sensitivity throughout learning.
Diffusion decision model
The DDM assumes that, when making a decision between
two options, noisy evidence in favor of one over the other
option is integrated over time until a pre-set threshold
is reached. This threshold indicates how much of this
relative evidence is enough to initiate a response. Since
the incoming evidence is noisy, the integrated evidence
becomes more reliable as time passes. Therefore, higher
thresholds lead to more accurate decisions. However,
the cost of increasing the threshold is an increase of
decision time. In addition, difficulty affects decisions:
When confronted with an easier choice (e.g., between a
very good and a very bad option), the integration process
reaches the threshold faster, meaning that less time is
needed to make a decision and that decisions are more
accurate. The DDM also assumes that a portion of the
RTs reflects processes that are unrelated to the decision
time itself, such as motor processes, and that can differ
across participants. Because of this dependency between
noise in the information, accuracy, and speed of decisions,
the DDM is able to simultaneously predict the probability
of choosing one option over the other (i.e., accuracy) and
the shape of the two RT distributions corresponding to the
two choice options. Importantly, by fitting the standard
DDM, we assume that repeated choices are independent
of each other, and discard information about the order
of the choices and the feedback after each choice. To
formalize the described cognitive processes, the simple
DDM (Ratcliff, 1978) has four core parameters: The drift
rate v, which describes how fast the integration of evidence
is, the threshold a (with a > 0), that is the amount of
integrated evidence necessary to initiate a response, the
starting-point bias, that is the evidence in favor of one option
prior to evidence accumulation, and the non-decision time
Ter (with 0 ≤ Ter < RTmin), the part of the response time
that is not strictly related to the decision process (RT =
decision time + Ter ). Because, in our case, the position
of the options was randomized to either the left or the
right screen position, we assumed no starting-point bias and
only considered drift rate, threshold, and non-decision time.
Within a trial, evidence is accumulated according to the
diffusion process, which is discretized in finite time steps
according to:
xi+1 = xi + N (v · dt,
√
dt), x0 = a/2 (4)
where i is the iteration within a trial, and a response is
initiated as soon as x ≥ a or x ≤ 0 (i.e., the evidence
reaches the upper or the lower thresholds, respectively). The
time unit dt is assumed to approach 0 in the limit (when
dt = 0, the integration process is continuous in time).
Choices are given by the value of x at the moment of the
response (e.g., correct if x ≥ a, incorrect if x ≤ 0).
In total, we fit three versions of the DDM, varying in
the number of free between-condition parameters. The first
DDM had separate vs for difficult and easy choices, to
allow accounting for the difficulty effect: Higher vs lead
to faster and more accurate responses. The second model
is as the first, but also has separate as for option pairs
with a higher or lower mean reward. This model variant
allows accounting for the magnitude effect: Lower as lead
to faster, but not much more accurate decisions (Forstmann
et al., 2011). This would explain the magnitude effect as
a reduction of cautiousness: When confronted with more
attractive options, individuals reduce their decision times
(and therefore the time to the reward) by setting a lower
threshold. The third model is as the second, but has also
separate vs for option pairs with higher or lower mean
reward, to check whether the magnitude effect is attributed
only to a modulation of the threshold (i.e., cautiousness) or
also to a modulation of the drift rate (i.e., individuals are
better at discriminating two good options compared to two
bad options).
Reinforcement learning diffusion decision models
The goal of our work is to propose a new model that
overcomes the limitation of both the SSM and the RL
frameworks. Therefore, we propose an RLDDM that is a
combination of these two classes of models. The RLDDM
simultaneously predicts choices and response times and
describes how learning affects the decision process. Here,
the DDM is tightly constrained by the assumed learning
process: Instead of considering all choices as independent
and interchangeable, the relationship between each choice,
the experienced reward feedback, and the next choice is
taken into account. The RLDDM assumes that, as in the
RL framework, the subjective values associated with the
options are updated after experiencing a reward feedback.
The decision process itself is described by the DDM. In
particular, the difference between the updated subjective
values influences the speed of evidence integration in the
next trial: When the difference is higher, as it might
happen after experiencing several feedback, the integration
becomes faster, leading to more accurate and faster
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responses. To formalize these concepts, we built a DDM
in which the drift rate parameter is defined on each trial
as the difference between the subjective values that are
updated via the learning rule of RL models. The first and
simplest RLDDM has four parameters (similarly to Model
1 in Pedersen et al., 2017): one learning rate η to update the
subjective values following Eq. 1, a scaling parameter vmod
to scale the difference between values, one threshold a, and
one non-decision time Ter . On each trial, the drift rate is
defined as:
vt = vmod · (Qcor,t − Qinc,t ) (5)
and within each trial evidence is accumulated as in Eq. 4.
Note that, since v is defined as the difference of subjective
values, the difficulty effect naturally emerges from the
model without assuming separate vs for easy and difficult
choices.
We considered three additional mechanisms and fit
different combinations of them, resulting in a total of
eight different models. The first variation is similar to one
considered for RL models and includes two separate ηs
for positive and negative prediction errors (as in Pedersen
et al.). The second variation is similar to one considered
in the DDM to account for the magnitude effect. However,
because subjective values are learned in time, instead of
fitting separate as for different pairs of options (as we
do in the DDM), we propose a trial-by-trial modulating
mechanism:
a = exp(afix + amod · Qpres) (6)
where afix is the fixed threshold, amod is the threshold
modulation parameter, and Qpres is the average subjective
value of the presented options. When amod = 0, this model
reduces to the simplest model. The third variation is to
make the mapping between subjective values and choices in
the RLDDM more similar to the mapping in the soft-max
choice rule. In Eq. 5, v is linearly related to the difference in
values. Since different pairs of options can have very similar
or very different values (e.g., in Fig. 1, pairs AB and AC),
participants might differ in how sensitive they are to these
differences. In RLmodels, this is regulated by the sensitivity
parameter θ . We therefore propose a very similar, nonlinear








S(z) = 2 · vmax
1 + e−z − vmax (8)
where S(z) is an S-shaped function centered at 0, and
vmax is the maximum absolute value that S(z) can take
on: limz→±∞ S(z) = ±vmax. While vmax only affects the
maximum and minimum values that the drift rate can take,
vmod affects the curvature of the function. Smaller values
of vmod lead to more linear mapping between the value
difference and the drift rate, and therefore less sensitivity
to value differences. Note that this model only resembles
the previous models in the limit (i.e., when vmax has higher
values).
Analysis of the behavioral effects
To assess the difficulty and the magnitude effects, we fit two
separate Bayesian hierarchical models: a logistic regression
on accuracy and a linear regression on log-transformed RTs.
Accuracy was coded as 0 if the option with the lower mean
reward was chosen (e.g., A is chosen over B), and as 1 if
the option with higher mean reward was chosen (e.g., B is
chosen over A). For both models, we included magnitude
and difficulty as predictors and tested main effects and
the interaction. Magnitude was defined as the true mean
reward in each pair of options, and was standardized before
fitting. Easy trials were coded as 1 and difficult trials as
-1. For simplicity, and because we were interested in cross-
trial effects, even though we were dealing with time-series
data, no information about trial number was included in the
models.
All models were fit using PyStan 2.18, a Python interface
to Stan (Carpenter et al., 2017). We ran four parallel
chains for 8000 iterations each. The first halves of each
chain were warm-up samples and were discarded. To assess
convergence, we computed the Gelman-Rubin convergence
diagnostic Rˆ (Gelman & Rubin, 1992). As an Rˆ close to 1
indicates convergence, we considered a model successfully
converged when Rˆ ≤ 1.01. Weakly informative priors were
chosen for both models. For a graphical representation of
the Bayesian hierarchical models and for the exact prior
distributions, see Appendix A.
To assess whether difficulty and magnitude had an
effect on the behavioral data, we calculated the 95%
Bayesian credible interval (BCI) on the posterior mean
group distribution of the regression coefficients. If the
BCI included 0, we concluded that there was no effect
of a manipulation on either RT or choices. Finally, to
assess model fit, we computed posterior predictive checks
(Gelman, Meng, & Stern, 1996) for mean accuracy and
mean RT for each pair of options and looked whether the
95% BCIs of the posterior predictive distributions included
the observed mean accuracies and RTs for AB, AC, BD,
and CD. Posterior predictive distributions are useful to
assess the quality of the models in their ability to predict
patterns observed in the data. To approximate the posterior
predictive distributions, we drew 500 samples from the
posterior distribution, generated 500 independent datasets,
and then computed the mean accuracy and mean RTs in each
dataset, separately for choice pairs.
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Model ﬁtting andmodel comparison
For all classes of cognitive models, parameters were
estimated using a Bayesian hierarchical modeling approach.
Again, all models were fit using PyStan. Since the models
vary in their complexity, the sampler was run for a different
number of iterations. We first started with few samples
(i.e., 1000) and checked for convergence, reflected in
Rˆ ≤ 1.01. If the model did not converge, more samples
were collected. We also checked for saturation of the
maximum tree depth (considered satisfactory if less than
.1%), energy Bayesian Fraction of Missing Information, and
for divergences (considered satisfactory if less than .1%).
Four parallel chains were run for all models and only the
second half of each chain was kept for later analyses.
To assess the predictive accuracy of the models, we com-
puted the widely applicable information criterion (WAIC;
Watanabe, 2013). To compute the WAIC, we used the vari-
ance of individual terms in the log predictive density summed
over the data points to correct for model complexity, as
it approximates best the results of leave-one-out cross-
validation (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Rubin, 2014). We also
computed the standard error of the difference in the predic-
tive accuracy of the best RLDDM, DDM, and among the
models of Pedersen et al., using the R package loo (Vehtari,
Gelman, & Gabry, 2017). This measure provides a better
understanding of the uncertainty around the difference in
WAIC scores. We then proceeded with the posterior predic-
tive checks: Posterior predictives were calculated for mean
accuracy and mean RT across learning by binning the trials
within the learning blocks in eight groups of ten trials and
across the pairs of options AB, AC, BD, and CD. As for the
regression analyses, we sampled 500 parameter sets from
the joint posterior distribution and generated 500 indepen-
dent full datasets using those parameters. We then computed
the mean accuracy and RTs in each dataset, separately for
choice pairs and trial bins.
For a graphical representation of the Bayesian hierar-
chical models, and details about the prior distributions, see
Appendix A. It has been shown that RL models can suffer
from poor identifiability due to low information content in
the data (Spektor & Kellen, 2018). To alleviate this concern,
we conducted a parameter recovery study whose results can
be found in Appendix D.
Results
Five participants were excluded for not reaching the
minimum criterion of accuracy (see Methods section),
so that the data of 27 participants were included in the
following analyses. The mean accuracy ranged from .43 to
.53 (M = .49, SD = .04) for the excluded participants, and
from .62 to .94 (M = .81, SD = .08) for the remaining
ones.
Behavioral results
On average, participants showed substantial learning effects
(Fig. 3a and b): The higher-valued option was chosen more
often throughout the trials (from M = .71 in the first 20
trials, to M = .86 in the last 20 trials), while at the same
time responses became faster (from M = 1.51 s in the
first 20 trials, to M = 1.36 s in the last 20 trials). They
also showed difficulty and magnitude effects (Fig. 3c and
d): They were more accurate in easier compared to difficult
choices (M = .89 compared to M = .74), while at the same
time being faster (M = 1.38 s compared to M = 1.46 s);
they were not more accurate in higher valued choice pairs
compared to lower valued ones (M = .81 compared to
M = .81), but they were faster (M = 1.35 s compared to
M = 1.48 s).
To test difficulty and magnitude effects on accuracy and
RTs across trials, we fit two regression models. Results from
the logistic regression model on accuracy suggest that only
difficulty, but not magnitude, had an effect on accuracy.
There was no interaction between difficulty and magnitude
on accuracy. In particular, participants were less accurate
when choosing between AB and CD compared to AC and
BD. The 95% BCI was higher than 0 (0.39 to 0.71, M =
0.56) for the mean group difficulty coefficient (meaning that
easier decisions were more accurate), but it was around 0 for
the magnitude coefficient (−0.27 to 0.16, M = −0.05) and
for the interaction coefficient (−0.26 to 0.15, M = −0.05).
To check whether the regression model predictions fit the
data well, we used posterior predictive checks. In particular,
we checked whether the regression model correctly predicts
the mean accuracy across different pairs of options. As can
be seen in Fig. 4a, the regression model correctly predicts
the observed pattern.
Results from the linear regression model on RTs
suggest that both magnitude and difficulty as well as
their interaction had an effect on RTs. In particular,
participants responded faster when BD and CD were
presented, compared to AB and AC. They were also faster
in easy trials (pairs AC and BD) compared to difficult trials
(pairs AB and CD) and this effect was stronger for less
attractive options. The 95% BCI was lower than 0 for the
group-level magnitude coefficient (−0.12 to −0.07, M =
−0.10), for the difficulty coefficient (−0.04 to −0.02, M =
−0.03) and for the interaction coefficient (−0.06 to −0.02,
M = −0.04). Similarly to the previous regression model,
we also checked whether the regression model correctly
predicts the mean RTs across the different pairs of options.
As can be seen in Fig. 4b, the regression model correctly
predicts the observed pattern.
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Fig. 3 Mean accuracy (a) and RT (b) across participants as it develops throughout learning. Solid lines represent the mean across experimental
blocks and participants, while the shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals. Mean accuracy (c) and RT (d) across participants and for
different pairs of options. Choices between options AC and BD were easier than between AB and CD, while the mean reward was highest in
pair CD followed by BD, AC, and AB. The dots represent the mean across trials, while the bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Multilevel
bootstrap was performed to account for repeated measures and therefore individual variability
Cognitivemodeling
To better understand the learning and decision processes
underlying value-based decisions, we fit and compared
three different classes of models: RL models, the DDM,
and RLDDMs, as well as previous attempts of combining
RL and the DDM (Pedersen et al., 2017). While RL models
can be only fit to choices, the DDM and RLDDM can be
simultaneously fit to choices and RTs. However, the DDM
does not take trial-by-trial information, such as the reward
Fig. 4 Posterior predictive distributions of mean accuracy (a) and
mean RT (b) for different option pairs according to the logistic and
linear regression models. The mean data (dotted lines) are compared
to the regression model predictions (solid lines). The shaded areas
represent the 95% Bayesian credible interval (BCI) of the posterior
predictive distributions. Pairs AB and CD have similar mean val-
ues while pairs AC and BD have different mean value. Mean values
increase from options AB, to AC, BD and CD
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Table 1 Widely applicable information criteria of the reinforcement learning models
Model η θ pWAIC −lppd WAIC
RL 1 One Fixed 48 2636 5368
RL 2 One Power 45 2645 5381
RL 3 Two Fixed 63 2569 5265
RL4 Two Power 72 2573 5291
Note. Models 1 to 4 are reinforcement learning (RL) models with learning rate η and sensitivity θ . The models could have a single or separate η
(for positive and negative prediction errors). θ could be fixed in time or increase as a power function of the number of times an option was seen.
pWAIC is the effective number of parameters, lppd is the log predictive accuracy of the fitted model to data, and WAIC is the information criterion.
Lower WAICs indicate better fits to data after accounting for model complexity.
feedback, into account. In the following section, we report
results from the model fitting and model comparison of
these models.
Among the RL models, model 3 provided the most
parsimonious account of the data. This model assumes
separate learning rate parameters for positive and negative
prediction errors and has a fixed sensitivity parameter
throughout learning. Compared to the other models
(Table 1), this model had the best predictive accuracy,
as indicated by a higher log pointwise predictive density
(lppd), and had lower complexity compared to the full
model (i.e., model 4), as indicated by the pWAIC. Judging by
the WAIC, models 2 and 4, having an increasing sensitivity
in time, did not outperform models 1 and 3, while the
separate learning rates increased fitness of the models. This
can be further assessed by looking at the 95% BCI of the
posterior predictive distribution of mean accuracy across
learning and pairs of options (Fig. 5). All models predicted a
nonlinear increase in performance throughout the trials, and
a difference between easy (i.e., AC and BD) and difficult
(i.e., AB and CD) choices.
The most parsimonious DDMwas model 2, with separate
drift rates for easy (i.e., AC and BD) and difficult (i.e.,
AB and CD) trials and separate response thresholds for
pairs of options with different mean reward distributions
(i.e., one for each pair: AB, AC, BD, and CD). As shown
in Table 2, this model had lower predictive accuracy than
model 3, as indicated by the lppd, but had also lower
complexity than model 3, as indicated by the pWAIC. The
WAIC was lower for model 2 than for model 3, indicating
that model 3 could not compensate its higher complexity
with a better fit. Checking the posterior predictives in Fig. 6,
we can see that: (a) all three versions of the DDM did not
predict any learning effect (i.e., both accuracy and RT are
stable across trials); (b) only the versions of the DDM with
separate thresholds for different option pairs could predict
the magnitude effect on RTs, without changing accuracy
predictions (i.e., having lower thresholds, responses in
higher-valued pairs are not less accurate but only faster); (c)
all models could predict difficulty effects on accuracy and
RTs; (d) predictions from model 3 were not qualitatively
better than predictions from model 2.
Among our proposed RLDDMs, the most parsimonious
model was the last, full model. In this model, separate
learning rates were fit for positive and negative prediction
errors, the drift rate was an S-shaped function of the
difference in subjective values, and the threshold was
modulated by the learned average subjective value of the
presented options, so that the threshold was lower when
the expected reward was higher. As shown in Table 3,
this model had highest predictive accuracy, as indicated
by the lppd, and highest complexity, as indicated by the
Fig. 5 Posterior predictive distributions of mean accuracy according
to the reinforcement learning (RL) models. The data (dotted lines) are
compared to the 95% Bayesian credible interval (BCI) of the poste-
rior predictive distribution (shaded areas), separately for the different
options pairs and for eight bins of trials within the learning blocks.
Model 1 is the simplest RL model with one learning rate η and one sen-
sitivity parameter θ . Models 3 and 4 have separate η for positive and
negative prediction errors. In models 2 and 4, θ increases as a power
function of the number of times an option is seen. According to the
WAIC the best model is model 3
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Table 2 Widely applicable information criteria of the diffusion models
Model v a pWAIC −lppd WAIC
DDM 1 Difficulty One 125 5194 10639
DDM 2 Difficulty All choice pairs 183 5034 10433
DDM 3 All choice pairs All choice pairs 232 4986 10435
Note. Models 1 to 3 are diffusion decision models (DDMs) with drift rate v, decision-threshold a, and non-decision time Ter . v could depend
either on choice difficulty only or different v could be fitted for each choice pair. a could be either fixed across conditions, or separate a could be
fit for separate pairs of options
pWAIC. Having the lowest WAIC suggests that the model’s
complexity is compensated by its superior fit to the data.
In Fig. 7, posterior predictives reveal how the different
models were able to capture the observed patterns in
accuracy and RTs. In particular: (a) all models were able to
capture learning effects as a decrease in RTs and increase
in accuracy over time; (b) all models captured difficulty
effects, but only models 5 to 8, by including a non-linear
mapping between value differences and drift rate, did not
underestimate accuracy for difficult (i.e., AB and CD)
decisions; (c) only the models that included a modulating
effect of values on the decision threshold could capture the
magnitude effect on RTs. While no significant qualitative
pattern could be observed for two compared to one learning-
rate models, all models with two learning rates had slightly
lower WAICs compared to their analogues with only one
learning rate. The best RLDDM also outperformed the best
DDM, both in terms of WAIC and in terms of posterior
predictive checks.
Among Pedersen et al.’s (2017) models, the most parsimo-
nious one was a model with separate learning rates for
positive and negative reward prediction errors, a drift rate
that is linearly proportional to the difference in values of the
correct and incorrect options, and a threshold that decreases
as a power function of time within a block. Note that this
was also the most parsimonious model in their task. A quan-
titative comparison between the different combinations of
models can be found in Table 4, while posterior predic-
tives can be seen in Fig. 8. The best of these models neither
outperformed any of those RLDDMs that included the
S-shaped mapping function in the drift rate, nor the ones
having a modulating mechanism of value for the threshold.
Fig. 6 Posterior predictive distributions of mean accuracy and
response time (RT) according to the diffusion decision model (DDM).
The data (dotted lines) are compared to the 95% Bayesian credible
interval (BCI) of the posterior predictive distribution (shaded areas),
separately for the different options pairs and for eight bins of trials
within the learning blocks. Models 1 and 2 have separate drift rates v
for easy and difficult decisions, while model 3 has separate v for each
option pair. Model 1 has a fixed threshold a, while models 2 and 3
have separate a for each option pair. According to the WAIC the best
model among DDM is model 2
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Table 3 Widely applicable information criteria of the reinforcement learning diffusion decision models
Model η v a pWAIC −lppd WAIC
RLDDM 1 One Linear Fixed 111 5129 10481
RLDDM 2 Two Linear Fixed 134 5051 10369
RLDDM 3 One Linear Modulated 145 4942 10174
RLDDM 4 Two Linear Modulated 159 4866 10048
RLDDM 5 One Sigmoid Fixed 137 4930 10135
RLDDM 6 Two Sigmoid Fixed 159 4861 10039
RLDDM 7 One Sigmoid Modulated 164 4672 9672
RLDDM 8 Two Sigmoid Modulated 190 4613 9607
Note. Models 1 to 8 are reinforcement learning diffusion decision models (RLDDMs) with learning rate η, decision threshold a, and non-decision
time Ter . The models could have a single or separate η (for positive and negative prediction errors), linear or non-linear mapping of value
differences to v, and fixed or value-modulated a
Fig. 7 Posterior predictive distributions of mean accuracy and
response time (RT) according to the reinforcement learning diffusion
decision models (RLDDM). The data (dotted lines) are compared to
the 95% Bayesian credible interval (BCI) of the posterior predictive
distribution (shaded areas), separately for the different options pairs
and for eight bins of trials within the learning blocks. Models 1 to
4 have a linear mapping between differences in values and the drift
rate v, and models 5 to 8 have a non-linear mapping. All models
with even number have separate learning rate η for positive and nega-
tive prediction errors. Models 1, 2, 5, and 6 have a fixed threshold a,
while, in models 3, 4, 7, and 8, a is modulated by the average value
of the options. According to the WAIC the best model among DDM,
RLDDM and the models of Pedersen et al. (2017), is model 8
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Table 4 Widely applicable information criteria of Pedersen et al. (2017)’s models
Model η v a pWAIC −lppd WAIC
Pedersen RLDDM 1 One Fixed Power 118 5100 10436
Pedersen RLDDM 2 One Power Power 112 5326 10875
Pedersen RLDDM 3 Two Fixed Power 141 5020 10322
Pedersen RLDDM 4 Two Power Power 126 5240 10732
Note. Models 1 to 4 are Pedersen et al. (2017) best fitting reinforcement learning diffusion decision models (RLDDMs) with learning rate η,
decision threshold a, and non-decision time Ter . The models could have a single or separate η (for positive and negative prediction errors), fixed
or increasing v, and fixed or decreasing a
Lastly, to have a measure of uncertainty of the difference
in WAIC scores, we calculated the standard error of the
difference in predictive accuracy of the best fitting RLDDM
with the best fitting DDM, finding a substantial difference
between the scores (elpddiff = −415.4, SE = 38.3), and
the best fitting model of Pedersen et al., finding a substantial
difference between the scores (elpddiff = −255.1, SE =
33.1).
Discussion
In the present work, we proposed a new process model for
value-based decision-making during learning. To test this
model, we collected data from participants performing a
multi-armed bandit task, in which both the value difference
between options as well as the mean reward of different
pairs of options were manipulated. This was done to
elicit two value-based behavioral effects known in the
literature: the difficulty (e.g., Dutilh and Rieskamp, 2016;
Oud et al., 2016; Polania et al., 2014) and the magnitude
(e.g., Palminteri et al., 2015; Pirrone et al., 2017; Polania
et al., 2014) effects. We first assessed value effects across
all trials by fitting regression models on accuracy and
RTs. We observed a magnitude effect on RTs only and a
difficulty effect on both RTs and choices. To gain insights
into the separate learning and value mechanisms, we
tested our model against RL models (from the value-based
decision-making tradition) and standard DDMs (from the
perceptual decision-making tradition). We also compared
our model to a previously proposed class of combined
RLDDM (Pedersen et al., 2017). Different classes of models
Fig. 8 Posterior predictive distributions of mean accuracy and
response time (RT) according to Pedersen et al. (2017) best-fitting
models. The data (dotted lines) are compared to the 95% Bayesian
credible interval (BCI) of the posterior predictive distribution (shaded
areas), separately for the different options pairs and for eight bins of
trials within the learning blocks. Models 1 and 3 have a linear scaling
parameter for the drift rate v, while in models 2 and 4 this parameter
increases as a power function of the trial number. Models 3 and 4 have
separate learning rate η for positive and negative prediction errors. In
all models, the threshold a decreases as a power function of the num-
ber of trials. According to theWAIC, the best model among the models
of Pedersen et al. (2017) is model 3
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were tested, when possible, quantitatively (i.e., whether our
model provided a better account of the data using a relative
measure) and qualitatively (i.e., whether our model captured
the observed patterns that were related to the experimental
manipulations).
Our analyses suggest that, while difficulty has an effect
on both accuracy and RTs, magnitude only affects RTs:
Difficult decisions tend to be slower and less accurate, while
decisions among higher-valued options tend to be faster, but
not less accurate. These results confirm previous studies that
investigated value-based decisions after preferences have
been formed (e.g., Pirrone et al., 2017; Polania et al., 2014)
as well as studies that compared approach and avoidance
behavior (e.g., Cavanagh, Wiecki, Kochar, & Frank, 2014;
Palminteri et al., 2015). In line with previous studies,
we also found that participants tended to become faster
and more accurate during learning, and more so for easy
compared to difficult trials. These behavioral patterns (a)
can only partially be predicted by RL models, as they do
not predict RTs, (b) are not predicted by the DDM, as it
does not take trial-by-trial feedback into account, and (c) are
fully predicted by RLDDM. By presenting easy and difficult
pairs of options, we also showed that a nonlinear mapping
between the difference in subjective values (learned via RL)
and the DDM drift rate improved the model fit substantially.
In other words, the drift rate may not double for option pairs
whose difference of means is twice as large (see Teodorescu,
Moran, & Usher, 2015 for a similar finding in perceptual
decisions). As a consequence, models that do not assume a
nonlinear mapping tend to underestimate the accuracy in the
difficult trials. Finally, to give an account of the magnitude
effect during learning, we proposed a mechanism in which
the threshold is modulated by the mean subjective values of
the presented options. By having a lower decision threshold,
decisions between higher-valued pairs of options become
faster, while accuracy only decreases to a minor extent. This
mechanism is also suggested by the estimated thresholds
in the DDM, separately fit for each pair of options:
Higher-valued pairs have a lower threshold (see Fig. 9a).
In the RLDDM, this is obtained by a negative threshold
modulation parameter: Negative values imply a lower
threshold for higher-valued options (see Fig. 9b). Cavanagh,
Wiecki, Kochar, and Frank (2014) also reported a reduction
of the threshold when comparing approach to avoidance
behavior, and interpreted this finding as a facilitation effect
on the cortico-striatal indirect pathway due to increased
dopamine levels, based on previous work (Wiecki & Frank,
2013). In both RL and RLDDM models, separating the
learning rate for positive and negative prediction errors
increased the predictive accuracy of the models, as indicated
by a lower WAIC. Although a qualitative difference in
fit cannot be visualized in the posterior predictive checks
we calculated, this result is in line with previous research
(Gershman, 2015; Lefebvre et al., 2017).
Notably, our proposed model has stricter constraints than
the DDM: When fitting the DDM to behavioral data, all
trials are collapsed into two RT distributions for choosing
high- and low-value options, meaning that slower decisions
will be in the right tail of the distribution, independently
of their occurrence at the beginning or at the end of a
learning block. In the RLDDM, the trial order is taken
into account, as the drift rate and the threshold depend on
the learned values in each trial. When fitting the DDM
using different parameters per condition, we also have less
constraints. By explicitly relating the difference in values to
the drift rate, and the mean learned values to the threshold,
Fig. 9 a Posterior distributions of the mean group threshold parame-
ters μa of the diffusion decision model in which separate drift rates
were fit for easy and difficult decisions, and separate thresholds were
fit for all different pairs of choices. Solid lines represent the 95%
Bayesian credible interval, and squares represent the mean of the
posterior distribution. b Posterior distribution of the mean group (in
orange) and of the individual (in grey) threshold modulator parameters
amod of the full reinforcement learning diffusion decision model
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we propose mapping functions that can accommodate the
observed results, providing more mechanistic explanations.
We also compared our best RLDDM to previously
proposed RLDDMs. We fit the four best models proposed
by Pedersen et al. (2017), and compared them quantitatively
(see Table 4) and qualitatively (see Fig. 8) to our models.
The quantitative comparison confirmed that our best
model had better predictive accuracy than those previous
models. The qualitative comparison shows that the models
proposed by Pedersen et al. (2017), which assume a linear
mapping between value differences and drift rate, largely
overestimate the difference in performance between easy
and difficult choices. Models that assumed an increasing
scaling parameter for the drift rate (i.e., models 2 and 4
in Fig. 8) predicted an almost linear increase in accuracy
throughout time, while the data suggest a more asymptotic
learning curve. Moreover, all models proposed by Pedersen
et al. (2017) predicted that the RTs for difficult (i.e., AB
and CD) decisions do not decrease in time as much as it
was observed in the data. Because Pedersen et al. (2017) did
not show the development of mean RT throughout learning,
we cannot assess whether this discrepancy was also present
in their data. Finally, since Pedersen et al. (2017) did not
manipulate mean reward of pairs of options and did not
include a mechanism to account for the magnitude effect,
their model is unable to explain this effect.
In this study, by combining DDM and RL models,
we aimed at providing a psychological account of the
processes underlying behavior in a RL paradigm, where the
expected reward and the difficulty varies across trials. As
behavioral effects in this task are not necessarily evident in
all behavioral measures (in particular, the magnitude effect
is only present in RTs), we showed how, by simultaneously
fitting choices and RTs and constraining them by feedback
data, we can provide a more complete account of the
cognitive processes in this task and identify mechanisms
that would remain undetected if only choices but not RTs
were taken into account.
Future work should test whether the best RLDDM
is also successful in describing behavior in different
learning paradigms by, for instance, investigating the
magnitude effect in the presence of gains and losses or
by manipulating the dispersion of the reward distributions.
Moreover, RLDDMs could be validated by linking model
parameters to neural measures. Trial-by-trial variables such
as prediction errors, reward expectation signals, trial-by-
trial threshold modulations, and individual parameters such
as learning rates for negative and positive prediction errors
can be easily estimated using this model. It would be
interesting to see whether the model predictions about
prediction errors are in line with previous work in RL
neuroscience (O’Doherty, Hampton, and Kim, 2007), and
whether the trial-by-trial adjustments of decision thresholds
are mapped onto the same brain circuitry which has been
reported for decision-making paradigms without learning
(Gluth & Rieskamp, 2017; Gluth et al., 2012; van Maanen
et al., 2011). An obvious limitation of any RLDDM is that it
can only be fit to two-alternative forced choice tasks. This is
problematic for paradigms such as the Iowa gambling task
(Bechara et al., 1994), for example, in which participants
choose between four decks in each trial, or for studying
context effects in experience-based decisions with more
than two options (Spektor, Gluth, Fontanesi, & Rieskamp,
in press). A different, multi-alternative SSM that is, for
instance, based on the linear ballistic accumulator model
(Brown & Heathcote, 2008) could offer an alternative.
In conclusion, by integrating knowledge from two
separate research traditions, we showed how an extended
computational model can promote our understanding of
the cognitive processes underlying value-based decisions
during learning.
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Appendix A: Bayesian hierarchical
regressionmodels
A graphical representation of the linear regression model of
accuracy can be seen in Fig. 10 on the right. The model,
model priors, and hyper-priors were specified as:
μα ∼ N (0, 5); σα ∼ HN (0, 5)
μβ ∼ N (0, 5);σβ ∼ HN (0, 5)
α ∼ N (μα, σα);β ∼ N (μβ, σβ)
pt,s = logit (Xt,sβs + αs); acct,s ∼ Bern(pt,s)
where α and β are, respectively, the intercept and the vector
of coefficients, andX is the predictors matrix.N is a normal
distribution with parameters mean and standard deviation,
HN is a half-normal distribution with parameters mean and
standard deviation, and Bern is a Bernoulli distribution with
a success probability parameter.
A graphical representation of the linear regression model
of RT can be seen in Fig. 10 on the left. The model, model
priors, and hyper-priors were specified as:
μα ∼ N (0, 5); σα ∼ HN (0, 5)
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Fig. 10 Graphical representation of the Bayesian hierarchical linear regression (on the left) and logistic regression (on the right) models. Shaded
nodes represent observed variables, while non-shaded nodes represent latent variables. Squared nodes represent deterministic variables
μβ ∼ N (0, 5);σβ ∼ HN (0, 5)
σ ∼ HN (0, 5)
α ∼ N (μα, σα);β ∼ N (μβ, σβ)
RˆTt,s = Xt,sβs + αs;RTt,s ∼ N (RˆTt,s , σ )
where α and β are, respectively, the intercept and the
vector of coefficients, σ is the noise term, and X is
the predictors matrix. N is a normal distribution with
parameters mean and standard deviation, and HN is a
half-normal distribution with parameters mean and standard
deviation.
Models specification followed the approach of Gelman
et al. (2014), while priors followed the prior choice
recommendations in the Stan manual.
Appendix B: Bayesian hierarchical cognitive
models
A graphical representation of the full reinforcement learning
model (i.e., with separate learning rates η for positive and
negative prediction error and increasing sensitivity θ ) can be
seen in Fig. 11. The model, model priors, and hyper-priors
were specified as:
μη± ∼ N (0, .8); ση± ∼ HN (0, .5)
Fig. 11 Graphical representation of the Bayesian hierarchical full
reinforcement learning (RL) model. Shaded nodes represent observed
variables, while non-shaded nodes represent latent variables. Squared
nodes represent deterministic variables
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Fig. 12 Graphical representation of the Bayesian hierarchical dif-
fusion decision model (DDM). Shaded nodes represent observed
variables, while non-shaded nodes represent latent variables. Squared
nodes represent deterministic variables
η± ∼ φ(N (μη± , ση±))
μb ∼ N (5, .5); σb ∼ HN (0, .5)
b ∼ exp(N (μb, σb))
μc ∼ N (−.5, .5); σc ∼ HN (0, .5)
c ∼ exp(N (μc, σc))
acct,s ∼ Bern(logit (pt,s))
where η± are the learning rates for positive and negative
prediction errors, b and c are the parameters that define the
increase of θ in time (see Eq. 3). N is a normal distribution
with parameters mean and standard deviation, HN is a
half-normal distribution with parameters mean and standard
deviation, and Bern is a Bernoulli distribution with a success
probability parameter.
A graphical representation of the Bayesian hierarchical
diffusion decision model (DDM) can be seen in Fig. 12. The
model, model priors, and hyper-priors were specified as:
μv ∼ N (1, 2); σv ∼ HN (0, 2)
v ∼ N (μv, σv)
Fig. 13 Graphical representation of the Bayesian hierarchical full reinforcement learning diffusion decision model (RLDDM). Shaded nodes
represent observed variables, while non-shaded nodes represent latent variables. Squared nodes represent deterministic variables. Vectors are
represented in bold font
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Table 5 Group parameter estimates of the full reinforcement learning model
Parameter M SD 2.5% percentile 97.5% percentile
φ(μη+ ) 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.10
ση+ 0.57 0.11 0.38 0.82
φ(μη− ) 0.24 0.04 0.17 0.34
ση− 0.32 0.21 0.02 0.79
exp(μθ ) 0.35 0.05 0.26 0.48
σθ 0.63 0.12 0.44 0.88
Note. The best-fitting reinforcement model had separate learning rates η+ and η− for positive and negative prediction errors, and fixed sensitivity
θ throughout learning. Note that μη+ , μη− , and μθ were transformed for interpretability
μa ∼ (1, 2); σa ∼ HN (0, .5)
a ∼ N (μa, σa)
μTer ∼ U(0, 1); σTer ∼ HN (0, .5)
Ter ∼ N (μTer , σTer )
vˆt,s =
{
vs, if acct,s = 1
−vs, if acct,s = −1
RTt,s ∼ Wiener(vˆt,s , as, Ters , .5)
where Wiener is the Wiener distribution (Navarro & Fuss,
2009) with parameters drift rate, threshold, non-decision
time, and relative starting-point,  is a gamma distribution
with parameters shape and scale, and U is a uniform
distribution with parameters lower and upper bounds. In our
case, the starting-point is fixed at .5, since the options were
randomly positioned on the right or left of a fixation cross
across the trials and we therefore assumed that participants
were not biased towards a particular position.
A graphical representation of the Bayesian hierarchi-
cal full reinforcement learning diffusion decision model
(RLDDM) can be seen in Fig. 13. The model priors and
hyper-priors were specified as:
μvmax ∼ N (0, 1); σvmax ∼ HN (0, .5)
vmax ∼ exp
(N (μvmax , σvmax)
)
μvmod ∼ N (−1, 1); σvmod ∼ HN (0, .5)
Table 6 Group parameter estimates of the diffusion decision model
Parameter M SD 2.5% percentile 97.5% percentile
μv,diff 0.67 0.07 0.54 0.81
σv,diff 0.33 0.05 0.24 0.45
μv,easy 1.28 0.08 1.11 1.44
σv,easy 0.42 0.07 0.31 0.58
μa,AB 1.97 0.06 1.86 2.09
σa,AB 0.27 0.05 0.19 0.37
μa,AC 2.11 0.08 1.94 2.27
σa,AC 0.39 0.07 0.28 0.54
μa,BD 1.81 0.06 1.69 1.94
σa,BD 0.31 0.05 0.22 0.42
μa,CD 1.70 0.05 1.61 1.80
σa,CD 0.23 0.04 0.17 0.32
μTer 0.75 0.02 0.71 0.80
σTer 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.17
Note. The diffusion decision model had separate drift rate v for easy (between AC and BD) and difficult (between AB and CD) choices, a different
threshold a for each pair of options, and one non-decision time Ter
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Table 7 Group parameter estimates of the full reinforcement learning diffusion decision model
Parameter M SD 2.5% percentile 97.5% percentile
φ(μη+ ) 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.12
ση+ 0.75 0.15 0.50 1.09
φ(μη− ) 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.14
ση− 0.58 0.13 0.37 0.87
exp(μvmod ) 0.48 0.10 0.32 0.70
σvmod 0.85 0.14 0.59 1.14
exp(μvmax ) 3.47 0.25 2.98 3.98
σvmax 0.31 0.07 0.20 0.47
μafixed 1.00 0.20 0.62 1.39
σafixed 0.97 0.14 0.73 1.26
μamod −0.010 0.006 −0.021 0.001
σamod 0.027 0.004 0.020 0.037
μTer 0.76 0.03 0.71 0.81
σTer 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.17
Note. The full reinforcement model had separate learning rates η+ and η− for positive and negative prediction errors, two parameters to describe
the non-linear mapping between the difference in values and the drift rate, a scaling parameter vmod, and an asymptote vmax, one fixed threshold
parameter afixed, one value-modulation parameter amod, and finally one non-decision time Ter . Note that μη+ , μη− , μvmod , and μvmax were
transformed for interpretability
vmod ∼ exp(N (μvmod , σvmod))
μafixed ∼ (1, 2); σafixed ∼ HN (0, .5)
afixed ∼ N (μafixed , σafixed)
μamod ∼ N (0, .1); σamod ∼ HN (0, .1)
amod ∼ N (μamod , σamod)
Priors and hyper-priors for η± were the same as in the
RL model, while for Ter they were the same as in the
DDM.
Table 8 Group parameter estimates of the model of Pedersen et al. (2017)
Parameter M SD 2.5% percentile 97.5% percentile
φ(μη+ ) 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.14
ση+ 0.57 0.11 0.39 0.81
φ(μη− ) 0.17 0.03 0.12 0.25
ση− 0.47 0.13 0.24 0.75
exp(μm) 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.17
σm 0.41 0.08 0.27 0.60
exp(μbp) 0.013 0.005 0.005 0.023
σbp 1.321 0.237 0.894 1.821
μbb 1.85 0.06 1.74 1.95
σbb 0.27 0.04 0.20 0.36
μTer 0.75 0.03 0.70 0.80
σTer 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.17
Note. The model of Pedersen et al. (2017) had separate learning rates η+ and η− for positive and negative prediction errors, a drift rate scaling
parameter m, two parameters to define the trial-by-trial decrease of threshold, bp and bb, and one non-decision time Ter . Note that μη+ , μη− , μm,
and μbp were transformed for interpretability
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Appendix C: Results of parameter estimation
In this section, we report the results of estimation of the
group parameters for the best-fitting models in each class
of models (i.e., RL, DDM, RLDDM, and the models of
Pedersen et al., 2017) (Table 5, 6, 7 and 8).
Appendix D: Parameter recovery
Models in decision-making, and particularly RL models, can
suffer from poor identifiability and parameter recovery, espe-
cially when the information content in the data is low (Spektor
& Kellen, 2018). To alleviate this concern, we conducted a
parameter recovery study for the most complex model, the
one that is most likely to suffer from poor identifiability.
We ran ten independent simulations based on the original
dataset (i.e., with the same number of participants and tri-
als per participant) and using the most likely samples of
the estimated joint posterior distribution. We then estimated
the group and individual parameters for each individual
synthetic dataset as described in the Methods section.
We inspected the results in three different ways: (1)
correlations across the samples of the group parameters
(i.e., mean and standard deviations); (2) ability to correctly
infer the group means; (3) ability to correctly infer the
individual parameters, summarized as mean and median of
the individual posterior distributions.
The correlations across samples can be seen in Fig. 14,
obtained by averaging the correlation matrices across the
Fig. 14 Mean (and, between brackets, SD) of the correlation between the samples of the group-level parameters, across simulations
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Fig. 15 95% BCI of the estimated mean and standard deviation of the group parameter distributions (grey lines) and true generating group
parameters (grey squared dots)
independent simulations, together with the SD across
correlations. The highest observed significant positive
correlation (ρ = .19 , p < 0.05) was found between σvmax
and σvmod , while the highest significant negative correlation
(ρ=−.15, p<0.05) was found between μvmax and μvmod .
The posterior distributions of the mean group param-
eters for the ten independent simulations can be seen in
Fig. 15. While most group means and standard devia-
tions were successfully recovered, σvmax was sometimes
underestimated.
Finally, recovery of individual-level parameters is shown
in Fig. 16. Most parameters recovered well and showed
a slight shrinkage to the mean (which is a feature of
hierarchical models).
Psychon Bull Rev
Fig. 16 Scatter plot of the estimated individual parameters, summarized as mean and median of the posterior distribution, against the true
generating parameters. All ten simulations are plotted here together
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